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INTRODUCTION
The medical journals are replete with P values and tests
of  hypotheses. It is a common practice among medical
researchers to quote whether the test of hypothesis
they carried out is significant or non-significant and
many researchers get very excited when they discover
a “statistically significant” finding without really
understanding what it means. Additionally, while
medical journals are florid of statement such as:
“statistical significant”, “unlikely due to chance”, “not
significant,” “due to chance”, or notations such as, “P
> 0.05”, “P < 0.05”, the decision on whether to decide
a test of hypothesis is significant or not based on P
value has generated an intense debate among
statisticians. It began among founders of  statistical
inference more than 60 years ago1-3. One contributing
factor for this is that the medical literature shows a
strong tendency to accentuate the positive findings;
many researchers would like to report positive findings
based on previously reported researches as “non-
significant results should not take up” journal space4-7.
The idea of significance testing was introduced by R.A.
Fisher, but over the past six decades its utility,
understanding and interpretation has been
misunderstood and generated so much scholarly
writings to remedy the situation3. Alongside the
statistical test of hypothesis is the P value, which
similarly, its meaning and interpretation has been
misused. To delve well into the subject matter, a short
history of the evolution of statistical test of hypothesis
is warranted to clear some misunderstanding.
A Brief  History of  P Value and Significance
Testing
Significance testing evolved from the idea and practice
of  the eminent statistician, R.A. Fisher in the 1930s.
His idea is simple: suppose we found an association
between poverty level and malnutrition among children
under the age of  five years. This is a finding, but could
it be a chance finding? Or perhaps we want to evaluate
whether a new nutrition therapy improves nutritional
status of  malnourished children. We study a group of
malnourished children treated with the new therapy
and a comparable group treated with old nutritional
therapy and find in the new therapy group an
improvement of nutritional status by 2 units over the
old therapy group. This finding will obviously, be
welcomed but it is also possible that this finding is
purely due to chance. Thus, Fisher saw P value as an
index measuring the strength of evidence against the
null hypothesis (in our examples, the hypothesis that
there is no association between poverty level and
malnutrition or the new therapy does not improve
nutritional status). To quantify the strength of  evidence
against null hypothesis “he advocated P < 0.05 (5%
significance) as a standard level for concluding that
there is evidence against the hypothesis tested, though
not as an absolute rule’’ 8. Fisher did not stop there but
graded the strength of  evidence against null hypothesis.
He proposed “if P is between 0.1 and 0.9 there is
certainly no reason to suspect the hypothesis tested. If
it’s below 0.02 it is strongly indicated that the hypothesis
fails to account for the whole of  the facts. We shall
not often be astray if we draw a conventional line at
0.05’’ 9. Since Fisher made this statement over 60 years
ago, 0.05  cut-off  point has been used by medical
researchers worldwide and has become  ritualistic to
use 0.05 cut-off mark as if other cut-off points cannot
be used. Through the 1960s it was a standard practice
in many fields to report P values with the star attached
to indicate P < 0.05 and two stars to indicate P <
0.01. Occasionally three stars were used to indicate P
< 0.001. While Fisher developed this practice of
quantifying the strength of evidence against null
hypothesis some eminent statisticians where not
accustomed to the subjective interpretation inherent in
the method 7. This led Jerzy Neyman and Egon
Pearson to propose a new approach which they called
“Hypothesis tests”. They argued that there were two
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types of error that could be made in interpreting the
results of  an experiment as shown in Table 1.
Table 1.Errors associated with results of  experiment.
The outcome of the hypothesis test is one of two: to
reject one hypothesis and to accept the other. Adopting
this practice exposes one to two types of errors: reject
null hypothesis when it should be accepted (i.e., the
two therapies differ when they are actually the same,
also known as a false-positive result, a type I error or
an alpha error) or accept null hypothesis when it should
have rejected (i.e. concluding that they are the same
when in fact they differ, also known as a false-negative
result, type II error or a beta error).
What does P value Mean?
The P value is defined as the probability under the
assumption of no effect or no difference (null
hypothesis), of obtaining a result equal to or more
extreme than what was actually observed. The P stands
for probability and measures how likely it is that any
observed difference between groups is due to chance.
Being a probability, P can take any value between 0
and 1. Values close to 0 indicate that the observed
difference is unlikely to be due to chance, whereas a P
value close to 1 suggests no difference between the
groups other than due to chance. Thus, it is common
in medical journals to see adjectives such as “highly
significant” or “very significant” after quoting the P
value depending on how close to zero the value is.
Before the advent of computers and statistical
software, researchers depended on tabulated values
of  P to make decisions. This practice is now obsolete
and the use of exact P value is much preferred.
Statistical software can give the exact P value and allows
appreciation of the range of values that P can take up
between 0 and 1. Briefly, for example, weights of  18
subjects were taken from a community to determine
if  their body weight is ideal (i.e. 100kg). Using student’s
t test, t turned out to be 3.76 at 17 degree of freedom.
Comparing tstat with the tabulated values, t= 3.26 is
more than the critical value of 2.11 at p=0.05 and
therefore falls in the rejection zone. Thus we reject
null hypothesis that ì = 100 and conclude that the
difference is significant. But using an SPSS (a statistical
software), the following information came when the
data were entered, t = 3.758, P = 0.0016, mean
difference = 12.78 and confidence intervals are 5.60
and 19.95. Methodologists are now increasingly
recommending that researchers should report the
precise P value. For example, P = 0.023 rather than P
< 0.05 10. Further, to use P = 0.05 “is an anachronism.
It was settled on when P values were hard to compute
and so some specific values needed to be provided in
tables. Now calculating exact P values is easy (i.e., the
computer does it) and so the investigator can report
(P = 0.04) and leave it to the reader to (determine its
significance)”11.
Hypothesis Tests
A statistical test provides a mechanism for making
quantitative decisions about a process or processes.
The purpose is to make inferences about population
parameter by analyzing differences between observed
sample statistic and the results one expects to obtain
if some underlying assumption is true. This comparison
may be a single observed value versus some
hypothesized quantity or it may be between two or
more related or unrelated groups. The choice of
statistical test depends on the nature of the data and
the study design.
Neyman and Pearson proposed this process to
circumvent Fisher’s subjective practice of  assessing
strength of evidence against the null effect. In its usual
form, two hypotheses are put forward: a null
hypothesis (usually a statement of null effect) and an
alternative hypothesis (usually the opposite of null
hypothesis). Based on the outcome of the hypothesis
test one hypothesis is rejected and accept the other
based on a previously predetermined arbitrary
benchmark. This bench mark is designated the P value.
However, one runs into making an error: one may
reject one hypothesis when in fact it should be accepted
and vise versa. There is type I error or á error (i.e.,
there was no difference but really there was) and type
II error or â error (i.e., when there was difference
when actually there was none). In its simple format,
testing hypothesis involves the following steps:
1. Identify null and alternative hypotheses.
2. Determine the appropriate test statistic and its
distribution under the assumption that the null
hypothesis is true.
3. Specify the significance level and determine the
corresponding critical value of the test statistic
under the assumption that null hypothesis is true.
4. Calculate the test statistic from the data.
Having discussed P value and hypothesis testing,
fallacies of hypothesis testing and P value are now
looked into.
Fallacies of  Hypothesis Testing
In a paper I submitted for publication in one of the
widely read medical journals in Nigeria, one of the
reviewers commented on the age-sex distribution of
the participants, “Is there any difference in sex
distribution, subject to chi square statistics”?  Statistically,
this question does not convey any query and this is one
of many instances among medical researchers
(postgraduate supervisors alike) in which test of
hypothesis is quickly and spontaneously resorted to
without due consideration to its appropriate
application. The aim of  my research was to determine
the prevalence of diabetes mellitus in a rural
community; it was not part of my objectives to
determine any association between sex and prevalence
Resultof experiment
The truth
Null hypothesis true Null hypothesis false
Reject null hypothesis
Accept null hypothesis
Type I error rate(α)        Power = 1-β
Correct decision Type II error rate (β)
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of  diabetes mellitus. To the inexperienced, this
comment will definitely prompt conducting test of
hypothesis simply to satisfy the editor and reviewer
such that the article will sail through. However, the
results of such statistical tests becomes difficult to
understand and interprete in the light of the data. (The
result of study turned out that all those with elevated
fasting blood glucose are females).  There are several
fallacies associated with hypothesis testing. Below is a
small list that will help avoid these fallacies.
1. Failure to reject null hypothesis leads to its
acceptance. (No. When you fail to reject null
hypothesis it means there is insufficient evidence
to reject)
2. The use of á = 0.05 is a standard with an objective
basis (No. á = 0.05 is merely a convention that
evolved from the practice of  R.A. Fisher. There is
no sharp distinction between “significant” and “not
significant” results, only increasing strong evidence
against null hypothesis as P becomes smaller.
(P=0.02 is stronger than P=0.04)
3. Small P value indicates large effects (No. P value
does not tell anything about size of an effect)
4. Statistical significance implies clinical importance.
(No. Statistical significance says very little about
the clinical importance of relation. There is a big
gulf of difference between statistical significance
and clinical significance. By statistical definition at
á = 0.05, it means that 1 in 20 comparisons in
which null hypothesis is true will result in P < 0.05!.
Finally, with these and many fallacies of  hypothesis
testing, it is rather sad to read in journals how
significance testing has become an insignificance
testing.
Fallacies of  P Value
Just as test of hypothesis is associated with some
fallacies so also is P value with common root causes, “
It comes to be seen as natural that any finding worth
its salt should have a P value less than 0.05 flashing like
a divinely appointed stamp of approval’’12. The
inherent subjectivity of  Fisher’s P value approach and
the subsequent poor understanding of this approach
by the medical community could be the reason why P
value is associated with myriad of  fallacies. Thirdly, P
value produced by researchers as mere ‘’passports to
publication’’ aggravated the situation 13. We were earlier
on awakened to the inadequacy of the P value in clinical
trials by Feinstein 14,
“The method of making statistical decisions about
‘significance’ creates one of the most devastating ironies
in modern biologic science. To avoid usual categorical
data, a critical investigator will usually go to enormous
efforts in mensuration. He will get special machines
and elaborate technologic devices to supplement his
old categorical statement with new measurements of
‘continuous’ dimensional data. After all this work in
getting ‘continuous’ data, however, and after calculating
all the statistical tests of the data, the investigator then
makes the final decision about his results on the basis
of a completely arbitrary  pair of dichotomous
categories. These categories, which are called
‘significant’ and ‘nonsignificant’, are usually demarcated
by a P value of either 0.05 or 0.01, chosen according
to the capricious dictates of the statistician, the editor,
the reviewer or the granting agency. If  the level
demanded for ‘significant’ is 0.05 or lower and the P
value that emerge is 0.06, the investigator may be ready
to discard a well-designed, excellently conducted,
thoughtfully analyzed, and scientifically important
experiment because it failed to cross the Procrustean
boundary demanded for statistical approbation.
We should try to understand that Fisher wanted to
have an index of measurement that will help him to
decide the strength of evidence against null effect. But
as it has been said earlier his idea was poorly
understood and criticized and led to Neyman and
Pearson to develop hypothesis testing in order to go
round the problem. But, this is the result of their
attempt: “accept” or “reject” null hypothesis or
alternatively “significant” or “non significant”. The
inadequacy of  P value in decision making pervades all
epidemiological study design. This head-or-tail
approach to test of hypothesis has pushed the
stakeholders in the field (statistician, editor, reviewer
or granting agency) into an ever increasing confusion
and difficulty. It is an accepted fact among statisticians
of the inadequacy of P value as a sole standard
judgment in the analysis of clinical trials 15. Just as
hypothesis testing is not devoid of caveats so also P
values. Some of  these are exposed below.
1. The threshold value, P < 0.05 is arbitrary. As has
been said earlier, it was the practice of Fisher to
assign P the value of 0.05 as a measure of evidence
against null effect. One can make the “significant
test” more stringent by moving to 0.01 (1%) or less
stringent moving the borderline to 0.10 (10%).
Dichotomizing P values into “significant” and “non
significant” one loses information the same way as
demarcating laboratory finding into normal” and
“abnormal”, one may ask what is the difference
between a fasting blood glucose of 25mmol/L and
15mmol/L?
2. Statistically significant (P < 0.05) findings are assumed
to result from real treatment effects ignoring the
fact that 1 in 20 comparisons of effects in which
null hypothesis is true will result in significant finding
(P < 0.05). This problem is more serious when
several tests of hypothesis involving several variables
were carried without using the appropriate statistical
test, e.g., ANOVA instead of  repeated t-test.
3. Statistical significance result does not translate into
clinical importance. A large study can detect a small,
clinically unimportant finding.
4. Chance is rarely the most important issue. Remember
that when conducting a research a questionnaire is
usually administered to participants. This
questionnaire in most instances collect large amount
of  information from several variables included in
the questionnaire. The manner in which the questions
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where asked and manner they were answered are
important sources of errors (systematic error) which
are difficult to measure.
What Influences P Value?
Generally, these factors influence P value.
1. Effect size. It is a usual research objective to detect a
difference between two drugs, procedures or
programmes.  Several statistics are employed to
measure the magnitude of effect produced by these
interventions. They range: r2, ç2, ù2, R2, Q2, Cohen’s
d, and Hedge’s g. Two problems are encountered:
the use of appropriate index for measuring the effect
and secondly size of the effect. A 7kg or 10 mmHg
difference will have a lower P value (and more likely
to be significant) than a 2-kg or 4 mmHg difference.
2. Size of sample. The larger the sample the more likely
a difference to be detected. Further, a 7 kg difference
in a study with 500 participants will give a lower P
value than 7 kg difference observed in a study
involving 250 participants in each group.
3. Spread of  the data. The spread of  observations in a
data set is measured commonly with standard
deviation. The bigger the standard deviation, the
more the spread of  observations and the lower the
P value.
P Value and Statistical Significance: An
Uncommon Ground
Both the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson (N-P) schools
did not uphold the practice of stating, “P values of
less than 0.05 were regarded as statistically significant”
or “P-value was 0.02 and therefore there was
statistically significant difference.” These statements and
many similar statements have criss-crossed medical
journals and standard textbooks of statistics and
provided an uncommon ground for marrying the two
schools. This marriage of  inconvenience further
deepened the confusion and misunderstanding of the
Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson schools. The
combination of Fisherian and N-P thoughts (as
exemplified in the above statements) did not shed light
on correct interpretation of statistical test of hypothesis
and p-value. The hybrid of the two schools as often
read in medical journals and textbooks of statistics
makes it as if the two schools were and are compatible
as a single coherent method of statistical inference 4, 23,
24. This confusion, perpetuated by medical journals,
textbooks of statistics, reviewers and editors, have
almost made it impossible for research report to be
published without statements or notations such as,
“statistically significant” or “statistically insignificant”
or “P<0.05” or “P>0.05”.Sterne, then asked “can we
get rid of P-values? His answer was “practical
experience says no-why? 21”
However, the next section, “P-value and confidence
interval: a common ground” provides one of  the
possible ways out of the seemingly insoluble problem.
Goodman commented on P–value and confidence
interval approach in statistical inference and its ability
to solve the problem. “The few efforts to eliminate P
values from journals in favor of   confidence intervals
have not generally been successful, indicating that the
researchers’ need for a measure of evidence remains
strong and that they often feel lost without one”6.
P Value and Confidence Interval: A Common
Ground
Thus, so far this paper has examined the historical
evolution of ‘significance’ testing as was initially
proposed by R.A. Fisher. Neyman and Pearson were
not accustomed to his subjective approach and
therefore proposed ‘hypothesis testing’ involving binary
outcomes: “accept” or “reject” null hypothesis. This,
as we saw did not “solve” the problem completely.
Thus, a common ground was needed and the
combination of  P value and confidence intervals
provided the much needed common ground.
Before proceeding, we should briefly understand what
confidence intervals (CIs) means having gone through
what p-values and hypothesis testing mean. Suppose
that we have two diets A and B given to two groups
of malnourished children. An 8-kg increase in body
weight was observed among children on diet A while
a 3-kg increase in body weights was observed on diet
B. The effect in weight increase is therefore 5kg on
average. But it is obvious that the increase might be
less than 3kg and also more than 8kg, thus a range can
be represented and the chance associated with this
range under the confidence intervals. Thus, for 95%
confidence interval in this example will mean that if
the study is repeated 100 times, 95 out of 100 the
times, the CI contain the true increase in weight.
Formally, 95% CI: “the interval computed from the
sample data which when the study is repeated multiple
times would contain the true effect 95% of the time.”
In the 1980s, a number of British statisticians tried to
promote the use of this common ground approach
in presenting statistical analysis16, 17, 18. They encouraged
the combine presentation of P value and confidence
intervals. The use of  confidence intervals in addressing
hypothesis testing is one of the four popular methods
journal editors and eminent statisticians have issued
statements supporting its use 19. In line with this, the
American Psychological Association’s Board of
Scientific Affairs commissioned a white paper, “Task
Force on Statistical Inference”. The Task Force
suggested,
“When reporting inferential statistics (e.g. t - tests, F -
tests, and chi-square) include information about the
obtained ….. value of the test statistic, the degree of
freedom, the probability of obtaining a value as
extreme as or more extreme than the one obtained
[i.e., the P value]…. Be sure to include sufficient
descriptive statistics [e.g. per-cell sample size, means,
correlations, standard deviations]…. The reporting of
confidence intervals [for estimates of  parameters, for
functions of parameter such as differences in means,
and for effect sizes] can be an extremely effective way
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of  reporting results… because confidence intervals
combine information on location and precision and
can often be directly used to infer significance levels”20.
Jonathan Sterne and Davey Smith came up with their
suggested guidelines for reporting statistical analysis
as shown in the box21:
Box 1: Suggested guidance’s for the reporting of
results of  statistical analyses in medical journals.
1. The description of differences as statistically
significant is not acceptable.
2. Confidence intervals for the main results should
always be included, but 90% rather than 95% levels
should be used. Confidence intervals should not
be used as a surrogate means of examining
significance at the conventional 5% level.
Interpretation of  confidence intervals should focus
on the implication (clinical importance) of the range
of  values in the interval.
3. When there is a meaningful null hypothesis, the
strength of evidence against it should be indexed
by the P value. The smaller the P value, the stronger
is the evidence.
4. While it is impossible to reduce substantially the
amount of data dredging that is carried out,
authors should take a very skeptical view of
subgroup analyses in clinical trials and observational
studies. The strength of  the evidence for
interaction-that effects really differ between
subgroups – should always be presented. Claims
made on the basis of subgroup findings should
be even more tempered than claims made about
main effects.
5. In observational studies it should be remembered
that considerations of confounding and bias are
at least as important as the issues discussed in this
paper.
Since the 1980s when British statisticians championed
the use of  confidence intervals, journal after journal
are issuing statements regarding its use. In an editorial
in Clinical Chemistry, it read as follows,
“There is no question that a confidence interval  for
the difference between two true (i.e., population) means
or proportions, based on the observed difference
between sample estimate, provides more useful
information than a P value, no matter how exact, for
the probability that the true difference is zero. The
confidence interval reflects the precision of  the sample
values in terms of  their standard deviation and the
sample size …..’’22
On the final note, it is important to know why it is
statistically superior to use P value and confidence
intervals rather than P value and hypothesis testing:
1. Confidence intervals emphasize the importance of
estimation over hypothesis testing. It is more
informative to quote the magnitude of  the size of
effect rather than adopting the significant-
nonsignificant hypothesis testing.
2. The width of the CIs provides a measure of the
reliability or precision of the estimate.
3. Confidence intervals makes it far easier to determine
whether a finding has any substantive (e.g. clinical)
importance, as opposed to statistical significance.
4. While statistical significant tests are vulnerable to type
I error, CIs are not.
5. Confidence intervals can be used as a significance
test. The simple rule is that if 95% CIs does not
include the null value (usually zero for difference in
means and proportions; one for relative risk and
odds ratio) null hypothesis is rejected at 0.05 levels.
6. Finally, the use of  CIs promotes cumulative
knowledge development by obligating researchers
to think meta-analytically about estimation,
replication and comparing intervals across studies25.
For example, in a meta-analysis of  trials dealing
with intravenous nitrates in acute myocardial
infraction found reduction in mortality of
somewhere between one quarter and two-thirds.
Meanwhile previous six trials 26 showed conflicting
results: some trials revealed that it was dangerous
to give intravenous nitrates while others revealed
that it actually reduced mortality. For the six trials,
the odds ratio, 95% CIs and P-values are: OR =
0.33 (CI = 0.09, 1.13, P = 0.08); OR = 0.24 (CI =
0.08, 0.74, P = 0.01); OR = 0.83(CI = 0.33, 2.12, P
= 0.07);  OR = 2.04 (CI = 0.39, 10.71, P = 0.04);
OR = 0.58 (CI = 0.19. 1.65; P =  0.29) and OR =
0.48 (CI = 0.28, 0.82; P = 0.007). The first, third,
fourth and fifth studies appear harmful; while the
second and the sixth appear useful (in reducing
mortality).
What is to be done?
While it is possible to make a change and improve on
the practice, however, as Cohen warns, “Don’t look
for a magic alternative … It does not exist” 27.
1. The foundation for change in this practice should
be laid in the foundation of teaching statistics:
classroom. The curriculum and class room teaching
should clearly differentiate between the two schools.
Historical evolution should be clearly explained so
also meaning of “statistical significance”. The
classroom teaching of the correct concepts should
begin at undergraduate and move up to graduate
classroom instruction, even if it means this teaching
would be at introductory level.
2. We should promote and encourage the use of
confidence intervals around sample statistics and
effect sizes. This duty lies in the hands of  statistics
                                                   Annals of Ibadan Postgraduate  Medicine. Vol.6 No.1 June, 2008   25
teachers, medical journal editors, reviewers and any
granting agency.
3. Generally, researchers, preparing on a study are
encouraged to consult a statistician at the initial stage
of their study to avoid misinterpreting the P value
especially if they are using statistical software for
their data analysis.
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